Managing with Power by Jeffrey Pfeffer

I finished this book in June 2026. I recommend this book 9/10.

Why you should read this book:

This is a college professor turning a class that he has taught at Stanford into a book. The book provides a good picture of how power has been gained or lost in bigger corporations and the government.

Get your copy here.

🚀 The book in three sentences

1. Look for where power sits in the organization today

2. Find your niche—focus—be an intelligence service

3. Make others dependent on your information/skills and be ready to pivot

📝 My notes and thoughts

• P29. Decisions and Implementations:

  • Decide what your goals are and what you are trying to accomplish.

  • Diagnose patterns of dependence and interdependence. What individuals are influential and important in achieving your goal?

  • What are their points of view likely to be? How will they feel about what you are trying to do?

  • What are their power bases? Which of them is more influential in the decision?

  • What are your bases of power and influence? What bases of influence can you develop to gain more control over the situation?

  • Which of the various strategies and tactics for exercising power seem most appropriate and are likely to be effective, given the situation you confront?

  • Based on the above, choose a course of action to get something done.

• P43. The conflict at Ford (and at other automobile companies as well) between finance and engineering was, at its heart, a conflict about how to view the world. Engineers fundamentally see cars and engines as technological challenges, as things to be built. They are interested in developing a technological advantage over their competitors and in being the first to introduce new features. They want to design and build cars that have elements of engineering excellence. Finance analyzes cars less in terms of their aesthetics or their engineering wizardry than in financial terms such as payback period, return on investment, and the amount of capital required to launch new car models or to introduce new technologies of engines or transmissions. The two groups look at the same project from different perspectives, and therefore come, in many instances, to very different conclusions. Ford developed front-wheel drive and numerous other engineering innovations, but it was often one of the last automobile companies to actually put these innovations into its cars.

• P67. In order to diagnose interdependence, it is necessary to ask a series of fairly straightforward questions:

  • Whose cooperation will I need to accomplish what I am attempting; whose support will be necessary in order to get the appropriate decisions made and implemented?

  • Whose opposition could delay or derail what I am trying to do?

  • Who will be affected by what I am trying to accomplish, in either a) their power or status, b) how they are evaluated or rewarded, or c) in how they do their job?

  • Who are the friends or allies of the people I have identified as influential?

• P67. End of chapter notes: You can locate power, like, salary, or location of size of people's offices. At Autodesk, it is sales and product. Or, Steve Blum and Raji.

• P69. Power comes from being in the "right" place. But what is the right place? A good place or position is one that provides you with: 1) control over resources such as budgets, physical facilities, and positions that can be used to cultivate allies and supporters; 2) control over or extensive access to information—about the organization's activities, about the preferences and judgements of others, about what is going on, and who is doing it; and 3) formal authority. Much of being in the right place comes from being in the right organizational subunit.

• P78. The necessity of matching personal characteristics to the situation can be seen in politics as well as in business. Ronald Regan, the former movie actor and U.S. president, came to office at a time in which mass communication, through the medium of television, was essential. Reagan had no skill in dealing with details, but was a "great communicator." Lyndon Johnson rose to power at a time when television was less important, and party organizations were stronger. The ability to pay attention to small details and the willingness to do favors for colleagues and constituents were critical. Had Regan and Johnson been able to exchange decades, it is likely that neither one would have been elected president.

• P81. End of chapter notes: Departments can increase power; for example, at Autodesk, you have to purchase through Ariba. Our power and strength lie in the ER analogy and that we have access to data. Also, remember that people's power might shift when entering new positions.

• P104. Many of the lessons in developing allies are apparent in the tale of Kawamata's rise to power at Nissan. One of the most important is the significance of finding others with common interests and building long-term relationships with them. Coalitions survive over time because each element recognizes a commonality of interests. Deals are one-time, one-shot-transactions with no commitment on anyone's part for the future. Kawamata recognized this distinction, and his masterful use of coalition was the source of his success in the firm.

• P121. I knew a man who was the director of engineering for a division of Genral Semiconductor Test Equipment located in Milpitas, California. At the time, the division was housed in a typical California R&D building—open-plan office, one level, and quite horizontally dispersed. His two predecessors had both been forced to resign, so it was clear that the position was a challenging one. The head of the division and his top managers had private offices along one wall of the building. After carefully studying the facility layouts, the new director of engineering decided not to occupy his office in the so-called Executive Row. He noted that during the course of the day, people walked to the cafeteria and to the washrooms. He found where the two paths tended to intersect near the center of the open-plan office layout and took that position as his work location. He attributes much of his subsequent success to that simple move, since it gave him much better access to what was going on in his department. He could keep on top of projects, answer informal questions, and, in general, exercise much more influence over the activities of the unit than he could have had he been off by himself.

• P123. To develop influence, we need to be plugged into the structure of communication and interaction, and that means seeking out interactions, even social interactions, strategically. Although Lyndon Johnson may have been somewhat extreme in this practice—dancing with congressmen's wives, playing the role of the professional son, spending hours meeting and talking with almost anyone who was available—it is the extremity, not the general content, of his behavior that sets him apart. The cultivation of social relationships and the jockeying for position in social as well as physical space is something that I observe frequently on the part of those seeking power, simply because it is essential that they do. For example, I knew a person who worked in human resources at Apple Computer. At the time, the firm was in some turmoil. Indeed, the Apple II division went through five general managers in less than 18 months. As a non-technically trained human resource professional, whose responsibilities included helping the general manager to manage the business, she needed to get up to speed and to obtain influence quickly. She instituted a series of get-togethers early on Wednesday mornings in which four people from different levels and units of the division were invited to coffee and croissants and an informal discussion. In about 10 weeks, she will know 40 key people in the division to whom she could go for advice, as well as having gathered a lot of information about the problems confronting the division. John DeLorean, from a more exalted position, did much the same thing when he took over the Chevrolet division. By meeting with divisional executives on their own turf and not summoning them to his office, and by listening to what they had to say, he communicated effectively that he was interested in their opinions, and also developed a more elaborate network of contacts than he might otherwise have had. Working to achieve centrality is particularly important for people of groups who would otherwise have little power.

• P139. Stanton had his tiny research department churning out facts and figures to salesmen trying to lure advertisers and choice affiliates from NBC. He was establishing himself as an executive with precise methods… Everyone called Stanton "Doc." . . . Before long, his research was used in almost every facet of CBS's business—to help attract advertisers and audiences, to select and build programs, and to help coax affiliates to switch from NBC to CBS. By 1938, he was research director with a staff of one hundred. Much of Stanton's information was obtained from the World Almanac, which was potentially available to anyone. However, through his hard work, his insight, and his willingness to track down information, he made himself indispensable. "Stanton's bywords around CBS became 'Let's find out.' Whenever there was a vacuum, Stanton would fill it with enthusiasm and dedication." Needless to say, there were more and more such vacuums to be filled, as his reputation as someone who gets things done, in this case, by analysis, grew. By 1942, Stanton was vice president in charge not only of the research department, but also of "advertising, sales, promotion, public relations, building construction, operations and maintenance, and supervising the seven radio stations owned and run by CBS.

• P143. In most organizations, consequently, performance means being knowledgeable, drawing criticism away from the boss, and accomplishing things that make the subunit and the boss look good. We may hope that what we have done has long-term value for the organization, but as I noted already in Chapter 1, evaluating decisions for their quality is often quite problematic. It is easier to fall back on indicators such as short-term practical results and problem-solving ability. In describing the source of Robert Moses's power during the LaGuardia mayoral administration, many of his contemporaries emphasized his ability to solve problems and get things accomplished:

  • Says Judge Jacob Lutsky, who not only served in the LaGuardia administration but was a top adviser to Mayors O'Dwyer, Impellitteri, and Wagner: "You've got to understand—every morning when a mayor comes to work, there are a hundred problems that must be solved. And a lot of them are so big and complex that they just don't seem susceptible to a solution. And when he asks guys for solutions, what happens? Most of them can't give him any. And those that do come up with solutions, the solutions are unrealistic or impractical—or just plain stupid . . But you give a problem to Moses and overnight he's back in front of you—with a solution, all worked out down to the last detail, drafts of speeches you can give to explain it to the the public, drafts of press releases for newspapers, drafts of the state laws you'll need to get passed, advice as to who should introduce the bills in the Legislature and what committees they should go to, drafts of any City Council and Board of Estimate resolutions you'll need; if there are constitutional questions involved, a list of the relevant precedents—and a complete method of financing, are all spelled out. He had solutions when no one else had solutions."

• P146. My notes: Being able to get things done or find solutions to problems will make you valuable—even if your solutions or outcomes are not the best ones. So, "move" things forward, compromise if you have to, get to the next step—don't worry too much about right or wrong.

• P153. One of the ways in which finance was able to assume such power at Ford and General Motors was that its initial capture of resources enabled it to hire the best and the brightest people in adequate numbers to build sophisticated and comprehensive financial reporting systems. Once the systems were in place, they became self-perpetuating because they were able to produce the kind of numbers and analysis that were impossible for others without access to the same level of resources. I have seen similar dynamics play out with respect to computers and information systems departments. A department that is underfunded cannot produce results, which in turn leads to a lack of reliance on the unit in the organization and an increasing inability to successfully compete for staff and budget. In this sense, building unity and consensus may be a critical first step in a department's strategy for building power.

• P155. There are few better examples of this entrepreneurial activity than John Dean's actions in his role as counsel to the president in the Nixon administration. When he started his job on July 27, 1970, the office of White House counsel had little power—and Dean knew it. "By all White House standards, my office was shabby. The walls needed painting, and the furniture looked like military discards . . . From my window I could gaze on an interior asphalt courtyard filled with delivery trucks . . . plus the rear ends of air conditioners in other office windows." But he had a plan to build the power of his unit by expanding its domain into issues that were critical to the Nixon administration. "Our conflict-of-interest duties were the key . . . The work was complicated and boring, but I had already sensed that it would produce new business. 'It seems that when you really get to know a man's personal financial situation . . . and then candidly discuss his job here to determine if he has any conflicts, you can end up in his confidence if you play it right. And once you're in his confidence, he sends you business.' Moreover, Dean soon figured out that the counsel's office could perform intelligence work for the White House. This was the same administration so obsessed with intelligence that it would eventually drift into the Watergate scandal—so getting into the intelligence business was clearly a smart way for Dean to expand the importance of his unit. "We had already assumed the role in our conflict-of-interest investigations. And we had Jack Caulfield, who knows such waters. We advertised our office as the place where questions would be answered. I encouraged this new specialty, figuring that intelligence would be more valued by the policy-makers than would dry legal advice. All through 1971, my 'warm-up' year, we were bombarded with intelligence requests. I learned a lot about some of the things my superiors were interested in. Dean put this learning to good use, increasing the size of his staff and, most significantly, becoming important to Ehrlichman and Haldeman, the two highest advisers to President Nixon. Although he was only in his early thirties at the time, Dean showed enormous skill in increasing the perceived importance of his unit and using this critically to become a more central player in the administration.

• P164. My notes: Look for department power. This is how ESE became powerful. Find your niche—and then make other reliable ones of it while you protect your domain.

• P166. The following characteristics as being particularly important for acquiring and holding great power in organizations: 1) energy, endurance, and physical stamina; 2) the ability to focus one's energy and to avoid wasted effort; 3) sensitivity, which makes it possible to read and understand others; 4) flexibility, particularly with respect to selecting various means in order to achieve one's goals; 5) the willingness to engage, when necessary, in conflict and confrontation, or, in other words, a certain degree of personal toughness; 6) the ability to submerge one's ego, at least temporally, and play the good subordinate or team player to enlist the help and the support of others. Some of these characteristics may bring one more social approval than others, but all seem to be displayed by people who are able to acquire and wield substantial power.

• P170. One aspect of this focus is an obsessive attention to small details. Attention to detail is critical for getting things done, and it is the one characteristic that is often lacking in students and managers I encounter. Many are too smart for their own good, in the sense that they have so much intelligence and such a wide range of interests that they do not focus on one or a very few things. Effort is wasted by being spread too thin, and more importantly, details that may be significant in the effort to build power and influence are often overlooked.

• P172. It should be clear that being sensitive to others does not mean that one is necessarily going to act in their interests, in a friendly fashion, or on their behalf. Sensitivity simply means understanding who they are, their position on the issues, and how best to communicate with and influence them. The negotiating context provides a setting in which the importance of this ability is well recognized. In the dispute resolution literature, one of the most common recommendations for reaching agreement is to negotiate over interests, rather than positions. This simply means finding out what the other party in the negotiation really wants and needs, and why, and then, perhaps, accommodating those requirements in ways the person had not even thought about.

• P185. My notes: the energy, focus, understanding others, flexibility, engaging in conflict, and letting go of ego will lead to more power.

• P198. Contrary to what many people assume, the most effective way to gain a person's loyalty is not to do him or her a favor, but to let that person do one for you... people get a kick out of being propositioned. The smart politician knows that in soliciting someone, he is not so much demanding a gift or service; he is offering the person the one thing he himself wants: the opportunity to get involved. (Benjamin Franklin mentioned this in his autobiography)

• P203. The scarcity principle has a number of applications, the most fundamental being that what you advocate should always appear to be scarce. If you are looking for a job, you should appear to be in high demand. If you are pitching a proposal, the proposal should only appear to be feasible for a limited time, after which the opportunity would be lost. Even better, someone else should be on the verge of taking advantage of it. In this regard, the use of deadlines is important. The scarcity principle also has obvious implications for pricing. Sometimes, the higher the price, the greater the demand, which at first glance would appear to violate normal economic assumptions. But a high price often signifies scarcity, and as a consequence, desirability. The more desirable the product, the greater its success in the marketplace.

• P235. Causing others to wait, or not waiting yourself, is more than a symbol of your own power—it is also a tactic that can be used to increase your power. By being late, you call attention to yourself, and this very fact of visibility can produce influence. Also, making others wait for you forces them to consider your implicit power over them. When you do arrive, others may pay more attention to you in order to convince you to arrive on time in the future, which again reinforces their awareness of their dependence on you. (Musashi always being late + my kids dragging their feet)

• P236. Johnson arrived twenty minutes late, punctually, to everything. "If you're on time, no one notices you," he would say. "If you are late, they pay attention." Changes in waiting arrangements, and who waits for whom, can signify changes in power relations. Even surrounded by the power and glory of the presidency, Harry Truman occasionally enjoyed playing the waiting game: Ken Hechler, who was director of research at the White House from 1948 to 1952, recalled the day Mr. Truman kept Winthrop Aldrich, president of the Chase Bank, waiting outside the White House office for 30 minutes. Hechler quoted Mr. Truman as saying: "When I was a United States senator and headed the war investigation committee, I had to go to New York to see this fella, Aldrich. Even though I had an appointment, he had me cool my heels for an hour and a half. So just relax. He's got a little while to go yet."

• P240. Suppose you have two proposals on the same general issue to be discussed and decided, such as two capital budgeting proposals, two new product ideas, two job candidates, two individuals up for tenure or partnership, and so forth. Even both to obtain favorable decisions. If you present the weaker proposal first, there is likely to be a lot of discussion and debate on its merits. If at the end of the discussion, the proposal fails, the implication of this choice for the stronger proposal is limited. The stronger proposal is different, and consequently, people will not feel that their decision to reject the first proposal commits them to also reject the second. In addition, having given you a rough time on the first proposal, people may want to relent and be easier on the second. The second proposal, which is stronger than the first in any event, will look particularly strong by comparison. Time will be getting short, and ideas of fair play and reciprocity will suggest that you should receive something from the meeting. Consequently, it is highly likely that at least the second, stronger proposal will be accepted, and if the first proposal is viewed favorably, both will be approved. Presenting the weaker proposal first will, therefore, tend to ensure that the stronger proposal is favorably received. If you present the stronger proposal first, there will still be a great deal of discussion. It is first on the agenda, so time is not scarce. Because it is not a sure thing, scrutiny will be intense. If it fails, the second proposal will certainly fail.

• P245. Perhaps the scarcest resource in organizations is attention. Time spent attending to one issue is time not devoted to other concerns. Thus, finding the right set of circumstances to advance one's ideas is critical. A good idea at the wrong time will, like the report on bombing North Vietnam, be ignored and shunted aside. On the other hand, an idea for a new product that would otherwise have languished may be received eagerly if times are tough, the competition keen, and the attention focused on promising new products. This is one reason why persistence so often pays off. If one proposes something, the odds of hitting the right moment are not necessarily great. But if one pushes the same plans, the same objectives, the same actions for a sustained period of time, mere chance suggests that eventually circumstances will make the proposal more apt, and it will get favorable attention.

• P279. Given the choice of influencing you through your heart or your head, I will pick the heart. It's your head that sends you to check Consumer Reports when you are thinking of purchasing a new car. It's your heart that buys the Jaguar or the Porsche. It's your head that tells you that political campaign speeches cannot be believed or trusted, but it's your heart that responds to the best oratory, and makes you refuse to vote for people who come across as "dull," as through that were a reason to vote or not vote for the governmental representative. "People are persuaded by reason, but moved by emotion."

• P284. Nixon commented, "The leader necessarily deals to a large extent in symbols, in images, and in the sort of galvanizing idea that becomes a force of history." In writing about leadership, Lou Pondy noted that one of the important tasks of leaders entails providing labels for activities and making them meaningful for organizational members: . . . the effectiveness of a leader lies in his ability to make activity meaningful for those in his role set . . . to give others a sense of understanding what they are doing and especially to articulate it so they can communicate about the meaning of their behavior . . . This dual capacity to make sense of things and to put them into language meaningful to a large number of people gives the person who has it enormous leverage.

• P288. "People tend to judge a man by his goals, by what he's trying to do, and not necessarily by what he accomplishes or by how well he succeeds."

• P288. Language is such a powerful tool of influence that I often advise people to diagnose the language in their own organizations. It can tell them a lot about how the organization thinks about itself and its activities. As a consequence, language can be a potent predictor of behavior. One of the more interesting diagnostics is the form of pronouns that one sees used in organizations. There are "I" and "me" organizations, and organizations that emphasize "we" and "us". There are also organizations in which other persons and units within the form are referred to as "they" or "them". Not only can this language tell you something about the organization's culture and health, but the language itself can also be important in exercising influence.

• P304. One of the important ways in which power is lost is just this—as environments and problems change, they require new approaches, new skills, and new relationships. Although individuals may have flexibility and some obviously have more than others, it is nevertheless true that people in general tend to resist innovation. We learn how to do things in a certain way, grow committed to our choices and our actions, become trapped by our particular form of expertise and by our particular networks of contacts and friendships, and, in short, are limited in our ability to even recognize the need for change, let alone to accomplish it. Power is lost, then, because of circumstances are often more changeable than we are.

• P323. The story is told that Alfred Sloan, when he ran General Motors in the 1920s and 1930s, would refuse to make a decision at a meeting if no one could argue a strong case against what was being proposed. He felt that if no one had any objections to what was being decided, it was because they had not thought long and hard enough about the questions under consideration. Sloan recognized that all important issues in organizations have multiple dimensions, and he wanted to be sure that all sides of a question had been thoroughly examined before something was decided.

• P340. What does it mean to manage with power? First, it means recognizing that in almost every organization, there are varying interests. This suggests that one of the first things we need to do is to diagnose the political landscape and figure out what the relevant interests are and what important political subdivisions characterize the organization. It is essential that we do not assume that everyone necessarily is going to be our friend, or agree with us, or even that preferences are uniformly distributed. There are clusters of interest within organizations, and we need to understand where these are and to whom they belong. Next, it means figuring out what point of view these various individuals and subunits have on issues of concern to us. It also means understanding why they have the perspective that they do. It is all too easy to assume that those with a different perspective are somehow not as smart as we are, not as informed, not as perceptive. If that is our belief, we are likely to do several things, each of which is disastrous. First, we may act contemptuously toward those who disagree with us—after all, if they aren't as competent or as insightful as we are, why should we take them seriously? It is rarely difficult to get along with those who resemble us in character and opinions. The real secret of success in organizations is the ability to get those who differ from us, and who we don't necessarily like, to do what needs to be done. Second, if we think people are misinformed, we are likely to try to "inform" them, or to try to convince them with facts and analysis. Sometimes this will work, but often it will not, for their disagreement may not be based on a lack of information; it may, instead, arise from a different perspective on what our information means. Diagnosing the point of view of interest groups as well as the basis of their positions will assist us in negotiating with them and predicting their response ot various initiatives. Third, managing with power means understanding that to get things done, you need power—more power than those whose opposition you must overcome—and thus it is imperative to understand where power comes from and how these sources of power can be developed. We are sometimes reluctant to think very purposefully or strategically about acquiring and using power. We are prone to believe that if we do our best, work hard, be nice, and so forth, things will work out for the best. I don't mean to imply that one should not, in general, work hard, try to make good decisions, and be nice, but that these and similar platitudes are often not very useful in helping us get things accomplished in our organizations. We need to understand power and try to get it. We must be willing to do things to build our sources of power, or else we will be less effective than we might wish to be. Fourth, managing with power means understanding the strategies and tactics through which power is developed and used in organizations, including the importance of timing, the use of structure, the social psychology of commitment, and other forms of interpersonal influence. If nothing else, such an understanding will help us become astute observers of the behavior of others. The more we understand power and its manifestations, the better our clinical skills will be. More fundamentally, we need to understand strategies and tactics of using power so that we can consider the range of approaches available to us, and use what is likely to be effective. Again, as in the case of building sources of power, we often try not to think about these things, and we avoid being strategic or purposeful about employing our power. This is a strategic or purposeful approach to employing our power. This is a mistake. Although we may have various qualms, there will be others who do not. Knowledge without power is of remarkably little use. And power without skill to employ it effectively is likely to be wasted. Managing with power means more than knowing the ideas discussed in this book. It means being, like Henry Ford, willing to do something with that knowledge. It requires political savvy to get things done and the willingness to force the issue.

• P344. Theodore Roosevelt, making a speech at the Sorbonne in 1910, perhaps said it best: It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, and comes short again and again; because there is not effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows the great enthusiasms; the great devotions; who spends himslef in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumphs of high achievement and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.